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Abstract: This paper analyzes, in a multiple principals/agency framework, the implications,
for agency behavior and control, of a major feature of the United States Administrative
Procedure Act, namely, the promotion of interest groups' participation in regulatory
proceedings. In our framework, the delegating parties, Congress and the president, cannot
observe neither the state of nature, that impacts upon the productivity of the regulatory
agency, nor the agency's effort level. As suggested by McCubbins and Schwartz (1984), the
participation in the regulatory process allows the interest group-monitor to observe the state
of nature (albeit imperfectly so), and hence signal its information to the delegating parties
(as suggested by McCubbins and Schwartz (1984)). We show that if the interest group-
monitor prefers outcomes associated, in expected sense, with high effort levels, then it may
prefer to hide information about high productivity states of nature. Thus, the interest
group-monitor may signal only "bad" states of nature (as in McCubbins and Schwartz's
(1984) "fire alarms"). We find that a major role of interest group-monitors is to restrict the
informational rents of the regulatory agency rather than to bias the outcome in the
direction most preferred by the interest group. As a consequence, both principals may
benefit from its participation. Our results, then, provide a formalization to McCubbins,
Noll and Weingast's (1987) (1989) insight about the role of the Administrative Procedure
Act in restricting agency discretion. Furthermore, we show that since collusion between the
regulatory agency and an "interested" monitor is less feasible than with an "uninterested" or
monitor, interest groups are more efficient monitors than "uninterested" ones. Finally, our
model provides an informational rationale for allowing all types of interest groups to
participate in regulatory proceedings - as is stipulated in the Administrative Procedure Act.
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1. Introduction.
Bureaucracies' managerial authority is delegated. Delegation, however, creates bureaucratic
discretion, raising the need for control. Following the economic literature on principal-
agent problems, the study of mechanisms to control bureaucracies has paid some attention to
the imposition of penalties, rewards and ex-post monitoring. Ex-post control, however, may
be costly to the delegator(s). Not only is monitoring costly, but the ability of carrying on
scheduled penalties may be greatly reduced following bureaucratic noncompliance, as new
constituencies mobilize to defend the new status quo. In other words, ex-post control is
quite limited. This insight has been recognized in a series of important articles by
McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (1987) and (1989) (MNW hereafter). Their insight is that
limited ex-post control makes it optimal to set ex-ante constraints on the agency's decision
making process. These constraints may take the form of particular procedural
requirements, including provisions to allow interest groups to participate at regulatory
proceedings. Through their participation at the hearing stage, interest groups may, as
suggested in McCubbins and Schwartz (1984), behave as monitors. McCubbins and
Schwartz's (1984) argument is that substantial congressional oversight is performed through
interest groups who play the role of "fire alarms", and that this type of oversight is more
efficient than regular monitoring, or "police patrols," as it allows members of congress to
investigate issues of real concern to their constituents. 1
In this paper we explore the MNW's (1987) (1989) insight, by modelling interest
groups as monitors in a multiple-principals/single-agent model. 2 They argue that legal
1 This does not imply that substantial direct congressional oversight is not undertaken. See,
in particular, Aberbach (1990).
2 The multiple principals-agency modelling approach we use here is related to that of
Spiller and Urbiztondo (1991) and Urbiztondo (1991), where the behavior of the
bureaucracy is the result of managerial authority delegated by members of Congress and the
president. Those papers, though, neglect any direct participation by interest groups. In
particular, Urbiztondo (1991) considers how cooperation among principals with opposed
interests is facilitated by the use of a monitor. The monitor reduces their ability to compete
<1>
constraints imposed in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) allow the president and
Congress to overcome informational asymmetries vis-a-vis the bureaucracy.3 In their own
words, "Administrative procedures constitute an additional mechanism for achieving
greater compliance. First, because they ameliorate the problem of asymmetric information,
administrative procedures are a useful, cost-reducing supplement to methods for monitoring
and punishing agencies. They reduce the informational costs of following agency activities
and specially facilitate "fire-alarm" monitoring through constituencies affected by an
agency's policies." (MNW (1987), page 273). We show that many of their implications can be
derived from a multiple-principals model when principals have opposed interests.
Furthermore, our framework provides new insights on the role of interest group-monitors
that were not explicitly analyzed in the literature. These insights arise from analyzing the
incentives for strategic behavior by interest groups, the interaction between ex-ante and ex-
post monitoring, and the effect ex-ante monitoring by interest groups has on the different
delegating parties (i.e. Congress and the president), issues that were left unexplored in MNW
and McCubbins and Schwartz (1984).
We explicitly let the delegating parties be Congress and the president (who are
assumed to have opposed interests), and analyze the difference between monitoring by
interest groups or by "regular" (i.e. uninterested) monitors, while still allowing some (but not
for the bureaucracy's favors, thus reducing the rents that the bureaucracy may extract. In
that paper this role is performed by an "uninterested" monitor, e.g. the General Accounting
Office, who audits ex-post the behavior of the regulatory agencies.
* The requirements of the APA can be summarized as follows (see MNW (1987)): 1) The
agency must inform about the "intention" of a new policy; 2) Agencies must solicit
"comments" by all interested parties; 3) Agencies must allow all parties to "participate" in
the decisionmaking process; and 4) Agencies must deal explicitly with all the evidence
presented to justify their decisions.
<2>
very powerful) ex-post control to the delegating parties. 4 Furthermore, we examine
whether both Congress and the president benefit from interest groups monitoring ex-ante
the bureaucracy even though the president's preferences may be opposed to those of the
interest groups. Our comparison of interested and uninterested monitors provides new
insights on their relative efficiency in performing ex-ante vis-a-vis ex-post monitoring. We
find that while interest groups have a comparative advantage in ex-ante monitoring (i.e.
providing information about the environment in which the agency works, and hece
suggesting new regulatory policies resulting from changes in technology, markets or
demands), they have no particular advantage in ex-post monitoring (i.e. in controlling what
the agency actually did). Thus, our model predicts that most ex-post monitoring should be
undertaken by "regular" monitoring agencies, like the Congressional Budget Office, the
Office of Management and Budget, and the General Accounting Office.
We want to capture the participation of interest groups as monitors who audit the
environment in which regulatory agencies act, and explore its implications. 5 Two main
possible effects can arise from this monitoring effort: First, we want to examine whether
the participation of interest groups whose preferences are aligned with those of Congress
actually moves the outcome in Congress's direction. A second possible effect is that ex-ante
monitoring by interest groups helps in restricting the rents extracted by the bureaucracy.
Were this the only effect, then, the participation of interest groups would have to be
A
It can be easily shown that without some ex-post control, ex-ante constraints do not
help. That is, even though MNW (1987) do not make it explicit, ex-ante constraints, i.e.,
requirements of due process, cannot affect the final outcome unless some authority is
available to punish deviations from the status quo.
We, therefore, do not consider other types of oversight, including the role performed
by the Congressional Budget Office, the Bureau of the Budget, and oversight practiced by
congressional committees. To the extent that these other overseers have internalized the
preferences of the principals they are serving (which is most clearly the case of
congressional committees), their strategic behavior will present some similarity to that of
interest groups. We do not pursue this point here. See Aberbach (1990) for a description of
congressional oversight performed by committees since the 1960s.
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subsidized as they will not have the benefit of moving the outcome closer to their own ideal
policy. Since Congress and the president are assumed to have opposed interests, would the
interest groups be able to move the outcome substantially closer to their own (and Congress')
most desired outcome, the president could be made worse off from the participation of
interest groups in the regulatory process. On the other hand, if the main effect of interest
group-monitoring is to reduce the rents extracted by the bureaucracy, then the president
could also benefit from the participation of interest groups even if they were able to move
the outcome, to some extent, towards their most desired direction.
We provide an example showing that, although the policies with an interest group-
monitor arc, in expected sense, closer to the ideal outcome of the monitor - assumed here to
be also that of Congress - a major effect of the participation of interest groups is to reduce
the rents of the bureaucracy, making both Congress and the president better off with
interest group-monitors than without.6 Finally, we also show that interest group-monitors
are more efficient than standard (uninterested) monitors, particularly when interest groups
with opposed interests can be simultaneously used as monitors.
Our model is related to recent research that has incorporated interest groups politics
into an agency framework (see Laffont and Tirole (1988) and Spiller (1990)). These papers
model the participation of interest groups either as direct principals of the regulatory
agency (Spiller, 1990), or as affecting the information disclosed by such agency about the
characteristics of a regulated firm (Laffont and Tirole, 1988). More precisely, Laffont and
Tirole (1988) consider the participation of interest groups influencing the efficiency of
regulation when a single principal (Congress) receives information about the agent (a firm)
from a monitor (a regulatory agency). Among other results, they show that potential
In this sense, contrasting with Laffont and Tirole (1988), interest groups can affect the
outcome even when they want efficient regulation. Observe that the interest groups play
here a different role than in Laffont and Tirole (1988), where they bribe the regulatory
ageney, a regular monitor, to hide information from Congress.
<4>
collusion between these interest groups (e.g., the firm and the environmentalists) and the
regulatory agency affects the characteristics of the delegation of authority, and that an
interest group is powerful only if it is interested in inefficient regulation (i.e., in inducing
the regulatory agency to withhold information from Congress). In particular, consumer
groups who want the agency to disclose information about "good" states of nature (i.e. states
of nature that turn out to increase consumer's surplus) have no power in affecting the
regulatory outcome, and, furthermore, do not increase social welfare (which is assumed to
be Congress's objective function). We find that once interest groups are allowed to perform
ex-ante monitoring activities, then the result of Laffont and Tirole (1988) concerning the
inefficiency of (for example) consumer groups' monitoring is reversed.
2. The model.
There are two principals called C (for Congress) and P (for president), one interest
group-monitor called M, and one agent called A, all assumed to be risk-neutral. The policy
outcome is a random variable x, which can take values (x L,x h) with x L<x h . Congress, the
president and the interest group-monitor are assumed to have preferences over the
outcomes. In particular, we will assume that Congress and the president have opposed
interests, so that C prefers a high outcome while P would prefer a low one.7 An impartial -
or regular- monitor (as in Urbiztondo (1991)) is one that has no preferences over outcomes.
Interest groups, though, have preferences over outcomes, making them different from
standard monitors. In general we will assume that NTs preferences are aligned with, but not
necessarily identical to, those of C. We model this by allowing their utility functions to be
given by:
7 We assume here that the agency has no direct preferences over outcomes. Observe,
however, that since we assume that the agency has disutility of effort, unless it is
motivated, its revealed preferences would be aligned with those of the president.
<5>
Uc=ax-Tc(x,r)-Sc(r), a>0, Tc(x,r)>0, S c(r)>0
UP=bx-Tp(x,r)-S p(r), b<0, Tp(x,r)>0, S p(r)>0
Uj^mx+S^rJ+SpCrJ-c,, and m>0, c
8
>0
UA=V(Tc(x,r)+Tp(x,r))-e, V (.)>0, V"(.)=0, UA>0
where a is the marginal utility C receives from the policy outcome xe{xL,x h), b is the
'
marginal disutility P receives from x, 8 m is the marginal utility M receives from x, r is the
interest group-monitor revelation of the state of nature, and UA is the agent's reservation
utility level. The policy outcome x results from the effort, e, taken by the agent and the
workings of nature. To look at the differences between ex-ante monitoring and ex-post
control, we let the action taken by the agent, e, be unobserved by all parties (C, P and M).
Thus, ex-post control cannot be based on what the agency did, but rather on what the
outcome actually was and what the monitor revealed ex-ante. The workings of nature is
modelled as a multiplicative random shock 8, such that the probability of outcome x h is a
random variable n(e)=Pr(x=x h/e,0)=0g(e) that depends on the agent's effort level (e) and the
realization of 0.9 Ex-post control is modelled as contingent transfers that both C and P
will make after observing the outcome. We model limited ex-post control by not allowing C
and P to impose unbounded penalties on the agent. 10 In particular, we allow only non-
8 We assume that a>|b|. This is a necessary assumption to make effort positive. We
assume that the principals cannot vertically integrate (a sufficient condition that generates
this constraint is that side payments between the principals can only be effected at the
beginning of the contract, before the outcome is observed). Vertical integration would take
the following form: C offers P a side payment of -bx+B, where B is a positive constant that
results from a bargaining game; this would leave P indifferent about the final outcome and
C would have marginal utility equal to a+b, where a>a+b>0.
9 Note the 8 affeels the marginal productivity of effort. Notice also that the range of e
has to satisfy g(e)<l/0, where 8 is the highest value 8 can possibly take.
1 Ex-post control is also limited in our model because transfers cannot depend on claims
the agent might attempt to make after observing the state of nature and choosing and
action. This prevents the principals from trying to extract the agent's information through
the use of an incentive compatible contract. See footnote 17 below.
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negative transfers. Thus, T
c
(x,r) and T
p
(x,r) represent the transfers C and P (respectively)
offer A as a result of x and the report r by the monitor. 11 As we show below, the
participation of the interest group as a monitor is not assured without transfers. First,
participation in regulatory proceedings is expensive. Call that cost c g. Second, since the
interest group is interested in high policy outcomes, it might find it optimal to strategically
withhold information from C and P. In particular, without further incentives, the interest
group-monitor would not report information that makes the policy further away from its
most desired outcome. This does not mean, however, that all information that benefits
Congress is released, as the interest group-monitor cares about the final outcome, but it does
not internalize Congress's expenditures in reaching that outcome. Congress and the
president, then, would have to pay for information that hurts the interest group-monitor. C
and P, however, may not want to offer those transfers, and hence some information may not
be revealed by the interest group. Let S
c
(r) and S
p
(r) represent the transfer C and P offer M
in exchange of the information r respectively. 12,13
The random shock d^ij] is assumed to arise from two possible distributions, each
being equally likely. These are:
11 Note that without the assumption that transfers are non-negative, the principal
wanting a low outcome could always offer a transfer negative enough as to induce
nonparticipation by the agent. While here we model transfers as monetary (i.e. through the
budgetary process), Congress and the president have many other instruments to reward or
punish agencies. Commissioners may be promoted to better agency positions (i.e. you may be
promoted from an obscure agency, like the FTC, to a very visible position at OMB, or your
term may be allowed to expire without being reappointed or promoted), or regulatory
powers may be withdrawn, or whole agencies may be eliminated.
12 To abbreviate notation, we denote T^(r) (T^(r)) the transfer offered by C for a low
(high) outcome given the report r. T
p
(r) and T
p
(r) are similarly defined for P. Notice that
the report r is the same to both principals. This assumption captures restrictions of ex parte
communication in section 5(c) of the APA. Furthermore, only "evidence" brought to the
hearing stage needs to be explicitly considered by the agencies to justify their decisions,
which means that all the information that is revealed has to be publicly announced, i.e., the
report to both principals cannot be different.
13 These payments may take the form of presidential favors for the organization of the
interest group, tax breaks, public recognition, etc.
<7>
1) f
h(*)=2(*-fi)/(0-fi) 2,
2) rL(6)=2($'8)/(d-&) 2.
These two distributions, then, represent two different expected productivities, a high
productivity state, h, and a low productivity one, L. We define, then, the expected agent
productivities as wh=E(0/fh)=(g+20)/3 and u>L=E(0/fL)=(2g+7)/3 depending on whether the
state of nature fh(0) or fL(0) occur. In particular, u>h>oL. We denote, then, the expected
probability of outcome xh when the effort taken is e and f*(8) is known as *j(e)=c^g(e),
where e^eL,eh], *-j(e)>0 and *-J(e)<0, for j=L,h. Finally, the report of the interest group-
monitor is re{s(0),<£}, where s(0)e{f(0),<£) is the signal received by M and <f> is the empty
set.
14 Let p^/2 denote the probability that the signal s(0)=f j(0), j=L,h, is received, with
p 9 being the complementary probability that s(0)=<£, i.e., P^+Pg^l-
15
To model ex-ante monitoring versus ex-post control, we let the agent learn f J(0)
before e is chosen, but after the transfers are offered. 16 In the absence of a monitor,
whether interested or regular, C and P do not know which distribution is the true one.
They make offers, then, knowing only that e comes with equal probability from f(0)=fL(0)
and from f(0)=fh(0). The only way C and P can obtain this information (with probability
p sfl) is from the monitor. Since the monitor we consider here cares about the final outcome
(M prefers a high outcome), he will always report the signal if such reporting will imply
14 Note that information is hard, i.e., if n(0) is reported to either principal, the report
must be correct. This is an important assumption, as it avoids the need to respect incentive
constraints on the monitor's disclosure of information. Indeed, this type of information is
required in section 7(c) of the APA, as "the proponent of a rule or order shall have the
burden of proof".
15 We follow Tirole (1986) here by letting the signal be exogenous.
This assumption avoids the extraction of the agent's information through the use of
an incentive compatible contract in which the agent has the incentive to disclose the
information she has about the true state of nature. The justification for its use in the
context of bureaucratic control is that regulatory agencies learn more about the
environment, i.e., about the regulated market, after regulation takes place. This
information, though, is readily available to the firms, i.e., the interest groups who behave as
monitors. See also footnote 10 above.
<8>
that (TJ}-T£) would increase. 17
We show below that this is the case when s(0)=fL(0). By reporting fL(0), M gets C
and P to adjust their transfers such that the equilibrium outcome moves closer to C and NTs
ideal policy outcome. On the other hand, for M to provide a signal that induces a reduction
in (T^-Tp), C and P (or either one of them) must compensate M for its consequent utility
loss. We show below that such is the case when s(0)=fh(0). Depending on the relative
intensity of the preferences of M, C and P, and on the ability of C and P to coordinate their
rewards, the signal s(0)=fh(0) may or not be reported.
The two principals are assumed to make simultaneous moves. Therefore, the timing
of the model is as follows: M receives the signal s(0); C and P pay M the rewards S
c
(r) and
S
p
(r) for its report r; 18 C and P offer contingent transfers T
c
(x,r) and T
p
(x,r) to the
agency; A observes f(0) and chooses its effort e; outcome x is observed; finally, transfers
T
c
(x,r) and T (x,r) are effected. The timing is summarized in the following diagram.
M receives s
I
C and P buy r
C and P offer transfers
Q
A observes f*(8) and chooses e
u
Outcome x is observed
Transfers are effected
17 We are disregarding here potential collusion between the agent and the monitor.
McCubbins et al. (1987, page 262) argue that APA rules against ex parte contact prevent this
from happening (see also section 5(c) of the APA). In any event, assuming that the interest
the monitor has about the outcome outweighs the agent's utility derived from informational
rents eliminates the possibility of collusion. Observe that if the monitor was a regular one,
then collusion between agent and monitor could be feasible and would have to be analyzed
(this would result in an additional -and costly- incentive compatibility constraint to
satisfy). We refer to this case in sections 6 and 7.
18 We let S(r)=0 for r=«£. Accordingly, if neither C nor P buys the signal we say that they
bought the signal 4> at zero price.
<9>
Thus, letting (l-TTj(e)) be the expected probability of a low outcome given the level of
effort e under distribution P(0), for j=L,h, the expected utilities once C and P obtained NTs
report are given by
EUC = (l^r(e
r))[axL-TL(r)]+7rr(e
r)[ax h-T^(r)]-S c(r),
19
r=L,j,<fc
EUP = (l-»rr(cr))[bxL-T^(r)]+irr(c'Xbxh-Tj(r)]-Sp(r)i r=L,j,&
EUM = (l-^Ce^JmxL+^Ce^mx^S^rJ+SpCrJ-c,,
20 j=L,M, r«L,M; and
j
EUA = (l-irj(cJ))[V(T^r)+T^r))]+irj(cJ)[V(Tj(r)+T5(r))]-cJ i j=L,h, r»L,M.
j
We assume the cost of the signal received by the monitor can take two values: c
8
=0, in
which case his participation takes place, or c
8»0, in which case he does not engage in
monitoring activities and the game is played by two equally (un)informed principals. Note
that the principal who prefers higher to lower output levels, C, has to satisfy the agent's
individual rationality constraint (IRCA) by himself, even for Tp=0.21
Note that if the information received by the interest group-monitor is about the
effort put forth by the agency, that is, its activity consists on ex-post monitoring, its
preferences about the outcome are irrelevant. Once the outcome has occurred, the monitor's
(whether interested or uninterested) best strategy is to report any signal received provided
that a compensation is offered for it. This compensation is, in equilibrium, only a function
of the agency's potential loss from the release of the information rather than of the
19
Tr^eO is the probability of a high outcome according to r. If r=<£, we define *^(e*) as
(7rL(e
L)+7rh(e
h
))/2, where e-* is the level of effort chosen by the agent having the information
that 7r(e)=7Tj(e), for j=L,h.
If s(6)=<f>, the monitor expects effort to come from (n-L(e
L)+*-h(e
h
))/2, where e j is the effort
level that is implemented when 7r(e)=7r:, for j=L,h. To abbreviate notation, and when no
confusion is created, we refer to this probability as n^(e).
21 Since transfers have to be nonnegative, Tp=0 in equilibrium, since P makes his offer
disregarding the IRCA.
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monitor's preferences. 22 Interest groups, then, are not more efficient than "regular"
monitoring agencies in performing ex-post monitoring. In what follows, then, we focus on
cases where the information received by the monitor is about the realization of the random
shock of nature 0, prior to the action taken by the agent.
3. Monitoring activity is not economically available.
To explore the role of the interest group-monitor, we first analyze the game when
only limited ex-post control is available. This can be understood as the case when the cost
of organizing the interest group and of participating in the regulatory proceedings are so
high that its participation is not worthwhile, i.e., c
g
»0. The purpose of this section is to
derive a benchmark case against which the use of interest groups as monitors can be
compared.
Without ex-ante monitoring, the sequence of the game is reduced to four stages: first,
the principals independently offer the agent transfers T
c
(x) and T (x); second, the agent
observes f(0) and chooses an action e; then, outcome x is revealed, and finally, transfers are
effected. Also, since C wants a high outcome, P wants a low outcome, and the transfers
have to be nonnegative, we obtain that T^=t£=0. 23 Thus,
EUC = (l-(7rL(eL)+^h(eh))/2)axL+((^L(eL)+Th(eh))/2)[ax h-Th(^)],
EUP = ((7rL(eL)+^h(e h))/2)bx h+ (l-(7rL(eL )+ 7rh(e
h))/2)[bx L-T^(^)], and
EUA = S [(l^j(e
j))V(TL(^))+WcJ)V(T5(^))-eV2.
J=L,h
We make two additional assumptions about the distribution functions for all realizations of
See Urbiztondo (1991) for an analysis of ex-post monitoring with multiple principals.
23 We assume here that T^=0 although it could be positive in general. This implicitly
assumes that the IRCA is satisfied with pure incentive considerations. Accordingly, we
disregard the IRCA in what follows.
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Q. These are:
Assumption 1: w' (e)/(l-*(e)), i.e., the hazard rate, increases with e, i.e.,
-tf"(e)(l-*(e))<tf'(e) 2 .24
Assumption 2: -^"(e)/*-' (e) decreases with e, but not "too fast", i.e.,
2>(tt' (e)7r"(e)/7r"(e) 2)>l ,25
Therefore, given the information available to the principals, C and P's problems are
respectively given by
max EUC with respect to e-5 and Tj?(<£) subject to
ej
*
= argmax EUA(e/f\9)\ T^\<t>) and EUA>UA,
and
max EUP with respect to e j and t£(<£) subject to
ej
*
= argmax EUA(e/f\6)) and T*\<f>) for j=L,h.
Each of the first two constraints in both problems is in fact a continuum of
constraints. Using the first order approach to the principal-agent problem,26 we can
replace each of these incentive constraints by 7Tj(e j)[V(T|?)-V(Tp)=l.27 Furthermore, we
assume that the agent's individual rationality constraint (IRCA) is not binding. Thus, the
24 This assumption is standard in the information literature. It basically says that given
that a high outcome has not occurred, increasing effort makes its appearance each time
more likely. It is respected by many distributions, in particular by n(e)=0(2-e _1 ) (where
ee( 1/2,1) for 0e(O,l]).
2 This assumption is satisfied by the density function referred to in the previous
footnote.
The functions UA(.) and tt( ) are chosen so that the use of this approach is valid here.
See Rogerson (1985) for a discussion of the conditions that make the use of the first-order
approach valid.
27 Note that an interior solution requires Tjj>Tp. This is assumed to be the case
throughout the paper.
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solution to C and P's problems arc given by Lemma 1 below:
Lemma 1: Assuming that IRCA is not binding, the solution to C's problem
is given by
eh *'fe)na(xh-xi)-T]X<t>)) 4*W)«jfeJ^ -
T&): -
xj: r^VW) - 1 - 0, j-LA
and the solution to P's problem is given by
e*: -n'£ei*)[b(xL-xti-T£{<t>)] + A^AK^)*^*) -
rjt*): - 1- *ij«
L
V*i/« h *)
j5
xfa'fel'w'iTfa))
-
AJ
p
: x'fe')*)AV(4>) - 1 - 0, y-LA
where ej * is level of effort under *(e)«Wj(e), aV(^)=[V(tJ(^))-
V(Tp(^))], and A^ and A^ are the Lagrangean multipliers associated
with the agent's incentive constraint when *-(e)=7Tj(e) 28
Summing up, when a monitor is not available the equilibrium expected level of
effort is e**=(eh*+eL*)/2, where ej *, j=L,h, comes from w'j(cj *)AV(^)=l. 29 Therefore, since,
*h>irL an(* 7r
"
<^' eh >eL » which in turn implies that eh*>e**>eL*. Thus we can state:
28 The proof is straightforward and is not presented here. Assumptions 1 and 2
guarantee that the second order condition for a maximum is satisfied (see section 4 below).
29 In the following sections we refer to e** as the level of effort that results when the
density function *^(e), although this density function does not exist.
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Proposition 1: When the marginal productivity of effort is lower (higher) than
expected, the implemented level of effort when the two principals are
equally uninformed results in the implementation of a lower (higher)
level of effort than the expected level.
The intuition behind the Proposition is clear. A higher marginal productivity of
effort implies that a given outcome can be achieved with a lower marginal disutility of
effort. Thus, when the agent is more productive than expected, transfers end up being too
high because the principals think that the marginal cost of inducing effort is relatively
high, which in turn results in the implementation of a higher than expected level of effort.
In the following section we analyze the benefits of using an interest group-monitor.
4. Monitoring activity is economically available.
Suppose a monitor is available, i.e., c
8
=0. Let us first analyze which signals will be
reported by the monitor if neither C nor P are willing to pay for the information. Since C
and P are always equally informed, we have to analyze the joint reaction of the principals
to the information disclosed. We perform this analysis by assuming that Congress and the
president have perfect information about the expected productivity of the agent (i.e., they
know f j(0), and therefore u>j=E(0|f j ), and letting their transfers to the agency react to
changes in this information.
Notice first that, from Lemma 1, the equilibrium is characterized by the following
system of equations
-nfe J) - —i L_ i - -
*'{(eb[v{T^j))-V(T*U)\
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_/ l7r
ju
_
^rj<g j)
2[MxL-^h) -rp^y)]^^;))
_
*}{eb[V(T]&)-V(T*U))
«'{eb{v(TlXj))-V(TliJ)) -1-0, forj-L,h.
The first equation results from C's problem (combining the first order conditions
with respect to e and TJ!), the second equation is similarly obtained from P's problem and
the last one is the (common) first order condition with respect to the Lagrange multiplier
(i.e., ICCA). Totally differentiating the system above, recalling that *j=t<>jg(e
j
), allowing cjj
to increase exogenously, and eliminating for notational simplicity the argument e, and the
subscripts and superscripts j, we obtain the following system:
/ 7T7T
-7T +
//
2- de -V(7jf„// 1Ak
h *V
f(Th L
c AV p
J (l-w)wW +- r—II 2- n 7T
Tzr
(i-
p^VTh
AV c
Mrfr
'
IFav
1 +
M[II
drf-0
n
ffAVde * Kfy!{T*)dT* - x'v'iT^dTp - -g'{e)LVdu.
Note that assumptions 1 and 2 assure that the first term of the first (second)
equation above is negative (positive). Then, it is easy to check that the determinant (A) is
negative and that 3e*/3u>0. Also,
37^ g
fVl
-IT
A
+ 1 7T7T
// 2-
and
37*.
P
_
g'v'
3w 77
-1 + (\-n)*" 2-
IF
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These two equations show how marginal changes in the agent's productivity affect C
and P's optimal transfers. The sign of these equations, however, is generally undetermined.
Nevertheless, a sufficient (but by no means necessary) condition for 5(Tj-Tp)/5axO is that
7r(e)>l/2.s0 Assume that this is the case. Then, the equilibrium level of effort
implemented as the agent becomes more productive increases even though the net incentive
received decreases. Thus we can state:
Lemma 2: If C and P are informed of u>, then, as long as 7r(e)>l/2 or *(e)= c^-e" 1 ),
exogenously increasing w will reduce the net incentive transfer (T*-T*J) and
increase the agent's equilibrium effort.
Therefore, if it depends on M to inform C and P about the true state of the world,
NTs optimal report strategy (absent direct monetary rewards) is to only disclose information
about low productivity states, and withhold information about high productivity ones, i.e.,
about fh(0). Thus, we can state:
Proposition 2: When the interest group-monitor observes fL(0), it discloses the
information. On the other hand, if it observes f h(0), it prefers
to hide the information.
In other words, even though e* increases with the agent's expected productivity, M
would not inform C and P about an increase in cj, since this implies a decrease in (T£-T£)
that partially offsets the positive effect of a high productivity shock. Therefore, if left
alone, M would only report bad productivity shocks, i.e., f(0)=fL(0). That is, the interest
group-monitor would only inform C and P about a lower than expected productivity of the
agent. This triggers a joint reaction by C and P that partially offsets the decrease in the
30
If ^(e)=o<2-e- 1), then dl\/du>0 and 3(TjVr£)/3axO for all 7r(e)>0.
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implemented e* that would have resulted if such a report was not provided.31 As a
consequence, the optimal strategy for both C and P is to offer nothing for that report.32
On the other hand, for the interest group-monitor to report its information s(0)=fh(0), it
would require C and/or P to provide it with positive payments.
Proposition 2, then, replicates McCubbins and Schwartz's (1984) "fire alarm"
strategies. Interest groups would contact Congress only when in the absence of their
information the agency would take an action that would make the interest group (and
Congress) worse off.
The next section analyzes the incentives for C and P to compensate the interest
group-monitor for a signal fh(0), and the resulting informational structures.
5. Alternative informational structures.
Suppose that the monitor receives a signal and does not transmit it. Then the signal
cannot be f(0)=fL(0). It can either be 4> or fh(0). Thus, using Bayes's Rule and the fact that
-before any signal is received- the probability that f(0)=fh(0) is the same as the probability
that f(0)=fL(0), i.e., 1/2, C and P know that f(0)=fh(0) with probability l/(2-p
Bfl), which is
higher than 1/2, and f(0)=fL(0) with probability (l-p
8fl
)/(2-p
8fl
).
33 Then, as a result of the
updated expectations, the principals believe that the agent is more productive than what
they would have believed had there not been an interest group-monitor, but less than if it
would have actually reported fh(0). That is, wh>wu>w*. Observe, however, that if the
31
It can be shown from Lemma 1 that if the monitor could make exclusive reports to
either Congress or the president, the incentives would be the same as with a common report.
This is because TJj (Tp) decreases (increases) with oj, which induces M to withhold signals
s(0)=fh(0). Furthermore, note that if this was possible, P would still benefit if C obtains an
exclusive signal f h(0), as this information results in the implementation of a lower level of
effort, whereas, for the opposite reason, C is harmed if P obtains an exclusive signal.
32 Thus, if s(0)=fL(0), then r=s(0), and S
c
(fL(0))=S
p
(fL(0))=O.
33
If the report r=fL(0) is not received free of charge the updated expected density function
is given by fu(5)=[l/(2-p
8(,)]f
h
(^)+[(l-p 8fl)/(2-p8e)]f
L
(5).
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monitor was a regular monitor, then such conclusion would be unwarranted. Notice,
furthermore, that even if none of the principals were willing to pay to obtain the signal
s(0)=fh(0), the mere presence of the monitor may still be beneficial as it reduces (although
does not eliminate) the asymmetry of information. As a consequence, both principals could
benefit from the existence of an interested monitor. On the one hand, the reduction in the
asymmetry of information tends to reduce the agent's informational rent. This effect is
beneficial for both principals. On the other hand, the presence of an interested monitor
may move the outcome in the monitor's most preferred direction. This may benefit
Congress but damage the president. For both principals to benefit, the former effect has to
be the dominant one. In section 7 we present an example where this is precisely the case.
We now compute the necessary transfers that induce the interest group-monitor to
disclose its information s(0)=fh(0). First, we note that the expected loss of utility suffered
by the monitor from reporting f(0)=fh(0) is given by m[7rh(e
hVT^(fu),T^(fu))-
7rh(e
h
*/Tj(fh),T^(fh))], where fu denotes the updated density distribution of believed by C
and P after a report r=<£. Since (Tjj-TJj) decreases with <j, the effort implemented after the
report r=fh(0) is released is lower than if s(8)=4> is reported, and therefore the term in
brackets is positive. Then, a signal s(0)=fh(0) will only be released if the rewards offered
by C and P are such that
S
c
(fh(<?))+S
p
(fh(^))>m[7rh(e
hVTj(f u),TL(f"))^h(e hVTj(fh),TL(ff))].
This being the case, the game is then played by two principals equally informed,
both of whom benefit from the availability of the monitor. Notice though that a free rider
problem arises here and difficulties in coordinating their rewards to the monitor may leave
the principals uninformed even though sharing the cost would make the (joint) acquisition
of the signal profitable. We illustrate this alternative with an example in section 7.
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6. Collusion between the agent and the interest group-monitor.
Monitoring by a single interest group
In previous sections we explored the role of an interest group-monitor as one that
provides ex-ante information to the principals about states of nature. So far, we have
assumed that the agent could not collude with the monitor to hide the information received.
We now relax this assumption and analyze the incentives for collusion between the agent
and the interest group-monitor.
We deal with two cases: first, when the agent prefers the principals to believe she has
a low productivity; and second, when she prefers to be seen as a high productivity agent.
When the agent wants the principals to believe her productivity is low, no collusion
would result in low states, since both the agent and the monitor benefit from making that
information public. When the interest group-monitor observes fh(0), however, neither the
agent nor the interest group wants to report it. Would C and P want to extract that
information from the interest group-monitor, they would have to pay M the combined loss
of utility that both the monitor and the agent would suffer from the report. Otherwise,
collusion between the agent and the monitor would prevent the report from taking place.
Observe that if M was an uninterested monitor, collusion could be avoided by simply paying
the monitor the agent's direct utility loss from the report. Thus, using an interest group-
monitor is less efficient. This is simply because getting information from a monitor is more
difficult when that information hurts him.
Consider, on the other hand, the case when the agent wants to be considered highly
productive (we show below that such circumsntances can arise with multiple principals).
She will try to compensate the interest group-monitor for not disclosing information about
low states of nature. Since an interested monitor intrinsically benefits from disclosure of
this information, collusion is less feasible than it would be if the monitor were a regular
one. Since avoiding collusion between the monitor and the agent is usually costly to the
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principals, interest groups-monitors are, in this case, more efficient than regular monitors.
Monitoring by multiple interest groups with opposed preferences
If, however, interest group-monitors with opposed preferences are available, then the
principals will always have, at least, one monitor that wants to release its information
freely.34 Thus, the possible collusion between interest group-monitors and the agent
discussed above is ameliorated. To see this, observe that with two interest group-monitors
of opposed preferences, the cost of preventing collusion equals the maximum of zero and
the difference between the agent's utility loss and the relevant interest group's gains. If the
monitor was an "uninterested" one, however, the cost of preventing collusion would equal
the agent's utility loss. Thus, the costs of preventing collusion now, are much lower than if
the monitor was an uninterested one. Furthermore, since the information the principals
obtain from multiple interest group-monitors is the same as with an "uninterested" monitor,
the expected outcome and agency effort under the two types of monitors are the same.
This discussion, then, provides a different rationale for McCubbins and Schwartz's
(1984) idea that "fire-alarms" are more efficient than "police-patrols," as well as for the APA
allowing multiple interest groups participating in regulatory proceedings.
To summarize, we have shown so far that the relative efficiency of a single interest
group-monitor vis-a-vis a single "uninterested" monitor depends on the nature of the agent's
preferences about the revelation of its type, and on the actual signal received. These
qualifications, however, are irrelevant when multiple interest group-monitors with opposed
interests are willing to participate. In this case we have shown that if information
gathering costs are zero, then interest group-monitoring is more efficient than regular
monitoring, the cost to the principals of preventing collusion between the agent and the
Interest group-monitors will always release freely s(0)=<£, as no principal would pay for
it.
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monitors is substantially lower when the monitors are interest groups rather than
"uninterested" agents.
We state these results in Lemma 3:
Lemma 3: When multiple interest groups with opposed preferences participate as ex-ante
monitors, then the principals' information, as well as the expected outcome
and agency effort is the same as if monitoring was performed by an
"uninterested" monitor. Furthermore, the cost of preventing collusion is lower
when monitoring is performed by interest groups.
If monitoring costs (c
8)
are positive, however, not only the participation of interest
groups as monitors has to be subsidized,35 but the existence of multiple interest group-
monitors implies duplication of monitoring costs. In our single dimensional framework,
however, the principals will not subsidize the participation of more than two interest groups
with opposed interests, as such structure would provide the principals with as much
information as the monitors are able to obtain. Thus, to the extent that the gains from
participation for each interest group are at least half of its own monitoring costs,36 then
the participation cost of the two interest groups-monitoring for the principals is lower than
if there was only a single "uninterested" monitor. Otherwise, there would be a tradeoff
between extracting informational rents and promoting the participation of multiple interest
group-monitors.
35 Since with multiple interest group-monitors the principals never pay directly for the
interest groups' information (assuming that collusion between the agency and the relevant
interest groups is not feasible), the interest groups cannot recover their monitoring costs. They
would be willing to participate only if their direct utility benefit from moving the regulatory
outcome closer to their ideal one exceeds their costs of monitoring.
36 That is, as long as the principals' total costs of subsidizing interest groups does not
exceed c
g
.
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We state this result in the following Proposition:
Proposition 3: If c
g
=0, then the use of multiple interest group-monitors of opposed
interests is more efficient than the use of "uninterested" monitors. If
c
8
>0, then, the relative efficiency of the different monitoring schemes
depends on the gains to the interest groups obtained from
participating as monitors.
Since, as we showed in section 2, interest groups are not more efficient than "regular"
monitors in performing ex-post monitoring activities, but they are in performing ex-ante
monitoring, we can state the following Corollary:
Corollary 1: Ex-ante monitoring of regulatory agencies should be performed mostly
by interested parties, while ex-post monitoring could be performed by
either interested or "uninterested" monitors.
The agent's signaling incentives
We show now that with multiple principals, there are cases where the agent actually
wants to be considered of high (rather than low) productivity. As discussed above, this
consideration is relevant to ascertain the relative efficiency of interest group-monitoring.
We proceed by assuming that the agent has the information about the state of nature
and she herself has to report it to the principals. Let the agent's report be denoted by cjk
,
where k=L,h, and consider the expected utility of the agent when she reports u>k and the
true distribution is f J(0). The agent's expected utility is given by
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EUA(u>
k//k6)) - *le>\T^\T^ k)))v(TtXu> k)) +
l-«j(|J*(lJc«VpV k)))WpV k)) -e^cA*"^); y-L^r.
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J
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which evaluated at k=j reduces to
8EUA(J/Ae))
&>J
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h
.* arJ-
-fo.J^e-O-.,.!)).^ ^(wJ). (3)
If equation (3) is negative, then the agent is better off claiming wk<uP, that is, the
agent wants the principals to believe her productivity is the lowest possible one.37
Observe, however, the sign of the expression in (3) may not be negative with multiple
principals. The reason is that C may increase his transfer for a high outcome when the
agent becomes more productive because P increases his. The aggregate reactions from the
two principals have to be computed to weight the benefit and the cost of misreporting in
either direction. This calculation is in general undetermined. Nevertheless, if ?r(e)=a)(2-e" 1 )
for 0e(O,l] and e£(l/2,l), equation (3) is positive. Thus we can state:
Note that if there is a single principal (who wants a high outcome, of course), we
would have
dEUA(J/f\e)) zrl
- */***) « V\u>h < 0,
since Tjj is a negative function of <J. (The derivation of this result follows from the
solution to Cs problem in Lemma 1.) That is, the agent wants to be taken as less efficient in
environments with a single principal.
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Lemma 3: If 7r(e)=(j(2-e" 1 ), then the agent wants the principals to believe f(0)=fh(0).
That is, if the expected productivity of the agent is given by 7r(e) = cj(2-e _1 ), then she
wants to be taken as the most efficient one, i.e., if f(0)=fL(0) the agent has an incentive to
lie and tell f(0)=fh(0). This implies that the agent has an incentive to bribe the monitor to
withhold a signal demonstrating that f(0)=fL(0). Incentive compatibility then requires that,
if necessary, the monitor should be rewarded by the principals for reporting that kind of
signal. Since an interest group-monitor who prefers high outcomes intrinsically benefits
from such a report, the necessary reward is lower (or, even zero) than that required to make
the contract collusion-free if the monitor was a regular one.
7. An example.
In this section we illustrate our results by means of an example. Let the model of
section 2 take the following parametric values: a=20, b=10, x h=l, xL=0, V(T)=T/10, £=2/3,
7=1, p 8fl=.5 and ?r(e)=w(2-e-
1
) for ee(0,l). Then, cjh=8/9 and uL=7/9.
Denote ee the expected level of effort. Then, the different information structures
result in the equilibria below:38
without
monitor
with
complete
information
with
regular
monitor
with IG-M:
fh is not
bought
with
multiple
IG-Ms
e
e
.779363 .781274 .780319 .780330 .780319
EUC 4.8984 4.946788 4.78011 4.918568 4.92259
EUP -7.80036 -7.69067 -7.8880 -7.76131 -7.74552
EUA .10944 .092775 .101107 .103323 .101107
EUC+EUP -2.90196 -2.7439 -3.1079 -2.8427 -2.8229
S3 The equilibria implicitly assume that an interest group-monitor cannot be bribed by
the agent to hide information from the principals. As noted before, this is quite natural
and it only requires that the interest group has a big stake at regulation, i.e., that m»0.
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As we can see, C and P always benefit from the availability of an interest group-
monitor (other things constant - i.e., transfers to M), even though the interest group-monitor
is able to bind the outcome closer to its most preferred policy. Note also that if the monitor
is uninterested about the outcome -a regular monitor-, the cost of making the contract
agent-monitor collusion proof requires that the principals pay M the money equivalent of
the agent's utility loss when information about her productivity is released. As we showed
to be the case in the previous section, the agent is willing to "bribe" the monitor to withhold
information about fL(0)> and is willing to pay up to (the money equivalent of) the loss in
her expected utility in such a case. This amount is equal to 1.13987 (and it is expected to
occur with probability p 8e/2), making the aggregate (net) utility of C and P become
-3.1079.39 Since the aggregate utility without a monitor is equal to -2.9019, a regular
monitor is not economical. That is, only interest group-monitors can be used.
Note, furthermore, that if in addition to the interest group-monitor we have been
considering, there is also another interest group-monitor that prefers low outcomes (and
hence would freely disclose information about high states of the nature), the principals
would obtain all the information received by each interest group-monitor. This would
render an equilibrium equal to that with a regular monitor but without subtracting from
the payoffs of the principals the rewards necessary to make the contract agent-monitor
collusion proof. Inspection of this alternative shows that having multiple interest group-
monitors with opposed interests available is the best alternative when there is asymmetric
information.
Finally, compare the equilibrium in which the principals obtain the information
fh(0) (prior to the rewards to the monitor, as it can be understood looking at the
equilibrium with multiple interest groups-monitors) with that in which the signal fh(0) is
EUC and EUP with a regular monitor in the chart are calculated assuming that this
cost is divided equally between the principals.
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not obtained. We can see, then, that C is willing to pay up to .004022 and P is willing to pay
up to .01579 for the report f h(0) (equal to the increase in EUC and EUP respectively).
Noticing that the expected change in the probability of a high outcome, given that
f(0)=fh(0) has occurred, and the report was obtained is equal to -.01 10633, we can see that C
is capable of buying such a report (profitably) without the cooperation of P only if the
marginal utility of the monitor, i.e., m, is less than .3635. Similarly, P could obtain the
report without C's help only if m is less than 1.427. Then, if m is less than .3635 it can be the
case that either C or P alone pays the full reward, or that C and P pay part of the reward
each. The (Nash) equilibrium results unavoidably in the acquisition of the signal f h .
Furthermore, if m is higher than 1.427 but less than 1.79 it is still feasible for both
principals to jointly obtain such report. Nevertheless, if the principals cannot coordinate
their transfers, the Nash equilibrium could now be that none of them obtains the reward,
resulting in a lost opportunity. If m is higher than 1.79, the signal s(0)=fh(0) will not be
bought as the maximum the principals are (jointly) willing to pay is always less than the
minimum M is willing to accept.
8. Final comments.
Recently, it has been suggested that the legal procedural requirements arising from
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) allow the president and Congress to overcome
informational asymmetries with respect to the bureaucracy. This paper provides a multiple-
principals/single-agent model that explores the interaction between ex-ante monitoring and
ex-post control. We show that allowing interest groups (which we model as interested
monitors) to participate at the hearing stages, as provided for by the APA, helps the
president and Congress to deal with a type of asymmetric information that ex-post
monitoring cannot overcome. We show that there is a basic advantage to using interest
groups rather than uninterested monitors: Even if the cost they incur in collecting
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information is the same, interest group-monitors are less prone to collusion with the agency
than regular monitors are. In other words, making a contract agent-monitor collusion free
is cheaper when the monitor has an intrinsic disutility from collusion. The effect of having
interest groups behaving as monitors is twofold: First, interest group-monitors may have an
impact on the final outcome. This effect, though, is lessened because the principals adjust
their expectations based on the interest group's revelations. A more powerful effect,
though, is that the interest group-monitor serves to reduce the rents of the agent. Since the
information freely obtained by the principals increases when there are various interests
groups who disclose information in strategically opposed directions, a more general
prediction of our model is that we should not observe restrictions to the participation of
interest groups at the hearing stage, i.e., the APA should -as it does in section 6(a)- allow
participation of multiple interest groups, i.e., consumers, environmentalists, firms, and other
affected parties. Finally, while the policy outcome that arises with multiple interest group-
monitors is the same as with a single "uninterested" ex-ante monitor, the agency is able to
extract much less rents when it is monitored by interest groups. Thus, when considering ex-
ante monitoring, both Congress and the president would prefer interest groups over
"regular" monitors, independently of what the interest groups' preferences are.
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